In recent years the American Psychologist, as is appropriate for the major voice of American psychology, has been the locus of commentary and controversy about the complex and intricate relationship between science, psychology, values, and morality. The value/ belief systems of psychologists and scientists have been examined for their social implications in such areas as religion, politics, economics, social policy, sex, and styles and quality of life (
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Philosophers, historians, sociologists, and psychologists of science also have been arguing with increasing regularity that the assumptions underlying a value-free view of science are problematic (Habermas, 1975; Holton, 1973; Koch, 1976 Koch, , 1981 Polanyi, 1958) . Critiques of the value-free position, which was based on the logical positivist analysis of physical sciences, have been applied to psychology (Buss, 1979; Mahoney, 1979; Sampson, 1978) . At question is the nature of what it means for a discipline to be called "scientific." A recognition that science is indeed value laden can lead to a more comprehensive analysis of scientific disciplines. Should such an analysis succeed in lifting the veil of value neutrality, then certain critical questions will come to the foreground for scientific scrutiny. For example, how are the goals of a discipline related to basic assumptions that are the preconditions for the activities of its practitioners? What are the consequences for scientific research, both content and method, of choosing one set of assumptions and not another?
The study of the "value" systems of two groups of psychologists that we are reporting can be interpreted most meaningfully within an interdisciplinary framework that integrates theories and research from philosophy, history, sociology, and the psychology of science. We include under the term values not only the everyday meaning of cherished personal and sociocultural norms but also the shared assumptions that communities of scientists make and use to guide their investigations. This value-laden view of science is contrasted to traditional value-free positions, and emphasis is placed on the psychology of science as the context for understanding how values influence scientists.
Science as Value-Free or Value-Laden
The traditional value-free conceptualization of science is captured in the phrase "science is about facts, not values." The argument for the value neutrality of science was founded on pivotal assumptions about epistemology and ethics developed in the logical positivist philosophy of science (Ayer, 1959) . The epistemological assumption of objectivism alleged that observation provided unassailable knowledge-the knowledge of "facts" and "raw data." By separating science into observation language and theoretical language, progress was to be guaranteed through adhering to the rules of formal logic (Suppe, 1974) , and the history of science was construed as a story of progress toward unbiased, objective knowledge. In addition, classical meta-ethical questions such as what norms and standards are of value were judged unanswerable because what is knowable consists of what is given as "raw data" in observation. Under this analysis, ethics was relegated to the meaningless (Carnap, 1928; Schlick, 1939; Wittgenstein, 1922) and was limited to the study of values as facts. The result of this analysis of science was to sharpen the fact-value distinction, leaving ethics and values to unscientific, speculative philosophers and bolstering the claim that science and "scientific" philosophy remain valueneutral.
The value-laden conceptualization of science arises from critiques of objectivism and discrepancies between the traditional accounts of scientific change and subsequent research in history, sociology, and the psychology of science. The claim that observation provided theoretically neutral, objective knowledge units was challenged both by scientists and by philosophers. Heisenberg (1958) pointed to the implausibility of "objective" observation, and Toulmin (1953) showed how theory and assumptions logically precede observation. Moreover, Hanson (1958) cogently argued that there could be no neutral observation language. Therefore, the fundamental assumption of objectivism is untenable, because it is neither physically nor philosophically possible to obtain knowledge without first choosing some assumptive framework. This framework is undetermined by observations; rather it constitutes the hermeneutic context for generating "facts" and giving meaning to observations (Heelan, 1983) . Though such assumptions are often tacitly held and subtly acquired in the socialization process of becoming a scientist, we believe it is fruitful to think of them as decisions that the scientist makes. As choices among an array of available assumptions, none of which has prior claim to "truth," discipline-specific assumptions function as value systems for the scientist. In this regard the epistemological status of scientific claims may be no less relativistic than the comparable status of value claims in philosophical ethics (Maclntyre, 1981) . What is of interest is the possibility of studying differences in the assumptive frameworks of different groups of scientists.
The traditional picture of the history of science as a story of gradual progress toward "objective truth" has been seriously challenged. On the basis of historical examination, Kuhn (1970) argued that major scientific change was due to changes in the assumptive framework of groups of investigators and not to deliberate logical evaluation of new "facts." Though there has been considerable controversy over the particulars of Kuhn's analysis (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970) , philosophers and historians are in general agreement that the traditional picture of the history of science is seriously flawed and in need of revision along the sociopsychological lines suggested by Kuhn (in Hesse, 1980) . Consistent with Kuhn's analysis, sociologists of science have pointed to the importance of norms and values among groups of scientists (Hagstrom, 1965; Merton, 1973) . According to this view, scientists must be understood in social context, where groups share common assumptions about their discipline. These assumptions not only guide the group in terms of what problems to investigate and what methods to employ but also provide it with a unique identity. In addition to such discipline-specific assumptions, sociologists of science have also emphasized understanding scientific developments in the broader social context, where scientists share the values of the larger society. By "getting in bed with a lion" and acknowledging the relationship between science and government funding, Bevan (1980 Bevan ( , 1982 metaphorically and conceptually contributed to this developing sociology of science.
In sum, a value-laden conceptualization of science makes the claim that scientists begin with assumptions and that these are not justifiable by appeal to "facts" or formal logic (Weimer, 1979) . Moreover, these discipline-specific assumptions function like "value" systems within a scientific community and may be related to broader values shared by the society. We believe that psychology is well suited to the systematic study of the value systems of scientists, and indeed, a new field of the "psychology of science" has developed.
Psychology of Science
Although a psychology of science can be traced back to the studies done by Anne Roe in the 1950s (1951, 1952, 1954) , it was Mitroff( 1974) who actually labeled this as a distinctive field. In his study of physical scientists (those investigating the Apollo moon rocks) Mitroff( 1974) contended that "there are distinct styles of inquiry in science, as well as distinct psychological types of scientists" (p. 220). In a subsequent work Mitroffand Kilmann (1978) included the psychology of science as one of the four major perspectives from which any science must be approached (in addition to philosophy, history, and sociology). For purposes of studying the values of scientists, the psychology of science is perhaps the most important of contexts (Elms, 1981; Kanfer, 1979; Katona, 1979; Scheibe, 1970; Wachtel, 1980) . Studies in the psychology of science have generally rejected the caricature of the scientist as neutral observer. For example, Roe (1961) stated, "Science is the creation of scientists, and every scientific advance bears somehow the mark of the man who made it. The artist exposes himself in his work, the scientist seems rather to hide in his, but he is there" (p. 456). In his brilliant and perceptive analysis of the "scientist as subject" Mahoney (1976) concluded that rather than neutral observer, "the scientist is probably the most passionate of professionals; his theoretical and personal biases often color his alleged 'openess' to the data" (p. 6). MitrofT(1974) concluded his empirical study of physical scientists by labeling as "myth" the portrait of the scientist as an unbiased, uncommitted, disinterested, passionless, and objective observer of facts.
As a stream of influence on the value-laden conceptualization of science, the psychology of science involves several substreams within it. First, there is. the systematic study of psychological characteristics of scientists. This includes studies of personal historical material, personality characteristics, and interests (Eiduson, 1962; Eiduson & Beckman, 1973; Kubie, 1954; Maslow, 1966; Roe, 1951 Roe, , 1952 Roe, , 1954 . A second substream is best illustrated by the approach of Mahoney (1976) , which involves an analysis of the interrelation between science as a social influence process and the individual scientist's characteristics and background. In effect, this can be called the social psychology of science because it focuses on the behavior of the individual scientist in response to broad social influences (Buss, 1979) .
The third substream, and the one most relevant for the present study, is the systematic study of the "values" of scientists. Gordon Allport's influence has been seminal in terms of his early empirical studies of values (see Allport, 1966 , for a review) and the impact on his students (Smith, 1980) . Since Allport, numerous investigators have proposed and tested empirical measures of values (Handy, 1970; Scheibe, 1978) . With few exceptions, however, the empirical study of values has not addressed the discipline-specific assumptions of scientists but has instead focused on political, moral, life-style, and religious values. Two notable exceptions to this trend have been the work of Joseph Royce (1964 Royce ( , 1975 and Richard Coan (1979) . In developing his Psycho-Epistemological Profile (PEP), Royce (1975) hypothesized that individuals adopted a hierarchy of values from among three sets of basic approaches to acquiring knowledge. The empiricist approach places a premium on observation and induction, whereas the rationalist approach favors formal logic and hypothetico-deductive method. In contrast, the metaphorical approach views knowledge acquisition as a process of creative insight and symbolic generalization. Coan (1979) extended Royce's work and developed his Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS) as a measure of basic assumptions specific to psychology. The TOS was designed to assess psychologists' endorsements of assumptions such as biological determinism, physiological reductionism, and mechanistic causality.
Though there is debate about the goodness of fit between Kuhn's (1970) model of scientific progress and the history of psychology (Peterson, 1981; Watson, 1977) , many agree that psychology can be fruitfully studied as an instance of science characterized by the growth and development of competing groups of investigators who endorse different sets of basic assumptions. One such group is the behavioral scientists who launched the behavior modification movement.
Many of the early investigators in behavior modification believed that there was a very close linkage between their research investigations and social or value implications. This view was clearly influenced by Skinner's writings, particularly Walden Two (1948) and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) . Walden Two anticipated many of the value issues arising from behavior modification that were to become the focus of social concerns from the 1960s to the 1980s. Krasner and , in one of the first books in this field, linked behavior modification with concerns of social values: "The very effectiveness of behavior modification, the use of terms such as manipulation, influence, and control of the environment, and the concept that the therapist has the responsibility to determine the treatment program, all lead to concern with social values" (p. 362). Bandura (1969) , in a most influential book, placed "the principles of behavior modification" within the conceptual framework of "social learning." He devoted an entire chapter to the discussion of value issues in the modification of behavior and argued for the specification of goals as the major value feature of behavior modification.
The behavioral scientists who have identified their research as behavior modification thus represent a clearly delineated community of scholars as well as members of a social movement in the 30-year period following the Second World War (Kazdin, 1978; Krasner & Ullmann, 1965 Ullmann, 1969; Ullmann & Krasner, 1965) . The behavioral movement during these three decades represented a unique development in, behavioral science involving the application of basic laboratory research to human behavior and social institutions. The behavior modification approach, as it has developed historically, has involved scientists in dealing with all aspects of human behavior with an impact on education, industrial organizations, political behavior, homes, prisons, mental health and illness, energy systems, transportation, and so on.
Hence, there has been an impact on virtually every aspect of American society. Because this behavior change technology based on "scientific" principles appeared to be effective in influencing (controlling?) human behavior, the behavior modification movement was from the outset acutely aware of ethical issues of science applied to human behavior (Goldiamond, 1965; Kanfer, 1965; Krapfl& Vargas, 1977; Krasner, 1962; Stolz, 1978) . As such, this group of behavioral scientists provides a good opportunity for the empirical study of the value systems of scientists, and indeed these scientists exemplify the importance of investigating the value orientations of psychologists in general in order to understand and to interpret their research.
The present study was conducted to assess the values of this group of psychologists in comparison with those of a group of their peers who did not identify with the behavior modification movement. It is a case study within the conceptual framework of science as value laden.
Case Study of Two Groups of Psychologists
The original pool of subjects consisted of 230 psychologists recruited by letter of invitation. The behavioral group contained 130 behavioral scientists who met the following selection criteria: (a) self-identification of their work as behavior modification during the period 1946-1976, (b) citation of the subject's work in publications on behavior modification in the period 1946-1976, (c) at least one publication or presentation prior to 1956 (dissertations counted), and (d) professional contact with at least one other member of this group. Forty-two subjects did not participate, and 6 failed to complete all aspects of the study, resulting in a response rate of 63%. Of the 82 who completed the study, 5 were female.
The comparison group consisted of 100 psychologists randomly selected from a list of first authors of all articles published in APA journals from 1945 to 1956. These subjects did not identify their work as behavior modification and were not, as a group, conducting research around a common theme. Sixteen subjects elected not to participate, 46 did not respond, and 1 of the remaining 38 failed to complete all aspects of the study. This resulted in a 37% response rate for the comparison group; 1 of the 37 participants was female. Prior to this particular study we have had continuous contact with the behavioral group as part of a broader project on the history of behaviorism. This may have been a factor in the higher response rate from this group of subjects than from the comparison group.
Some demographic and background features of each group are summarized in Table 1 . The difference in age between the two groups was significant, t{\ 17) = 3.20, p < .01. The behavioral group was younger, probably due to differences in the modal year of graduation. It is clear from Table 1 that the two groups received their doctoral training at different institutions, though some institutions were represented in both groups. Though not statistically significant, there was a tendency for the behavioral group to contain more experimentalists, whereas the comparison group contained more clinicians. In other respects, the two groups were comparable.
Measures
In addition to broad demographic information, all subjects provided responses to three questionnaires designed to assess their values. All three asked subjects to respond to items on 5-point bipolar scales ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement.
Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS). This 32-item scale developed by Coan (1979) assessed subjects' assumptions about psychology. The TOS has been shown to have adequate reliability and validity (Coan, 1979) and factors into eight subscales that assess endorsement of the following dimensions: (a) factual versus theoretical orientation, (b) impersonal causality versus personal will, (c) behavioral versus experiential content emphasis, (d) elementarism versus holism, (e) biological determinism, (f) environmental determinism, (g) physicalism, and (h) quantitative versus qualitative emphasis on method. The scale also yields scores on two second-order factors: objectivism versus subjectivism and endogenism versus exogenism. Internal consistency of the eight subscales in our data was generally within acceptable limits (Cronbach's alpha ranged from .85 to .57). A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation replicated the eight first-order factors reported by Coan (1979) .
Epistemological Style Questionnaire (ESQ.). This 24-item scale was rationally constructed to assess three basic epistemological assumptions about science: (a) empiricism, (b) rationalism, and (c) metaphorism. The scale was based on the conceptual outlines of Royce(1975) and Mitroff( 1974) . Reliabilities for the three a priori subscales were not adequate (Cronbach's a = .48, .25, and .50, respectively). Therefore, exploratory factor analysis was conducted.
Factor analysis of the ESQ revealed four factors that were labeled (a) Metaphor ism, (b) Rationalism, (c) Reductionism, and (d) Antiempiricism, with reliabilities (Cronbach's a) of .65, .61, .64, and .50, respectively. The Metaphorism scale contained eight items and was scored in the positive direction for an intuitive approach to science. Items expressed the intuitive nature of scientific work as opposed to the assumptions of rational order and the primacy of data. For example, subjects who scored high on this factor endorsed items such as "The universe is fundamentally chaotic" and disagreed with statements (Hollingshead, 1975) . b Only institutions graduating 3 or more subjects are included.
such as "Having a feel for one's subject that goes beyond the existing data contributes little to scientific progress." The Rationalism scale contained seven items and was scored in the positive direction for deductive as opposed to inductive method. Subjects who scored high on this factor strongly agreed with items such as "Hypothetico-deductive method is superior to inductive method" and disagreed with items such as "Observation of raw data is both prior to and independent of theory." The Reductionism scale contained three items all scored positive for disagreement with statements such as "Psychology cannot in principle be reduced to physical science." The Antiempiricism scale contained six items and was scored in the positive direction for opposition to traditional empiricism. Subjects who scored high on this factor (5) Social Philosophy (7) Political Philosophy (6) Health Care Delivery (4) Environmentalism (5) Research/Ethics (7) . endorsed such statements as "Scientists are so engrossed in procedural detail that they lose track of the basic meaning of their subject" and disagreed with items such as "Scientific observation provides us with hard data independent of our subjective desires, wishes, and biases." Across both groups, correlations between the derived scale scores of the ESQ and the more established scale scores of the TOS lent concurrent validity to derived scales. For example, the Metaphorism scale was negatively correlated (r = -.54, p < .001) with the second-order TOS Objectivism factor. In contrast, the Reductionism scale of the ESQ was positively correlated (r = .46, p < .001) with this same TOS factor. Similarly, the Rationalism scale of the ESQ was negatively correlated (r = -.61, p < .001) with the TOS scale that emphasizes factual inductive method as opposed to rational theoretical approach, and the Antiempiricism scale of the ESQ was also negatively correlated (r = -.34, p < .001) with this same TOS scale.
Values Survey (VS).
This 67-item questionnaire was originally obtained from a pool of 150 statements (derived from the vast literature on values) that expressed values about sociopolitical philosophy, health care delivery, personal life-style, religion, and other domains. A panel of eight philosophers and scientists who had published in the area of science and ethics had been requested to categorize items into 15 domains of value systems.' A second reduction of the VS items was made when reliability analysis of the 67 items for the present sample showed eight of the original subscales to be adequate, and these were used in all subsequent analyses. The eight subscales of the VS are described in Table 2 . Table 3 contains the mean scores and standard deviations for each group on the eight primary and two secondary scales of the TOS. Multivariate analysis scales of the ESQ showed that the groups differed significantly on all four. Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of the eight scales of the VS for each of the two groups. Multivariate analysis of the eight scales yielded no significant between-group differences on this measure of values. The behavioral and comparison groups endorsed similar values in matters related to science and ethics, theism, sociopolitical philosophy, and the other broad value domains assessed by the VS.
A series of multiple regression analyses with VS scale scores as predictors and TOS and ESQ scores as dependent variables revealed four significant but weak relationships between broad values and assumptions about psychology and science. The Research/Ethics and Social Philosophy scales of the VS significantly predicted behavioral versus experiential content emphasis within psychology, R = .34, F(2, 116) = 7.35, p < .001. Subjects who endorsed freedom of inquiry as opposed to ethical constraints on research (B = -.24) and who favored social darwinism as opposed to social altruism (B = .22) also favored behavioral as opposed to experiential content emphasis within psychology. Subjects who endorsed the view that science is value neutral on the VS Science/ Ethics scale also favored Physiological Reductionism, R = .25, F(l, 117)i = 8.06, p < .01, and quantitative as opposed to qualitative methods in psychology, R = .36,F(1, 117)= 16.97, p<. 001. In contrast, subjects who endorsed the view that science is value laden favored an intuitive approach to science, R = .28, F(l, 117) = 9.57, p< .01.
Because there was considerable variability on the VS within each group and because we were particularly interested in identifying subgroups within the behavioral group, a cluster analysis of subjects of between-group differences on the eight primary scales yielded a highly significant multivariate effect, Hotelling's !T 2 (8, 115) = 47.47, p < .001.
2 Follow-up univariate t tests showed that the two groups of psychologists differed significantly on seven of the eight scales, the exception being their equally moderate endorsement of Biological Determinism.
Means and standard deviations on the four ESQ scales are presented in Table 4 , and the results of multivariate analysis indicated that the two groups differed significantly, Hotelling's r 2 (4, 119) = 22.63, p < .001.
3 Univariate follow-up tests on the four sub-2 Because there was a significant age difference between the two groups, multivariate analysis with age as a covariate was conducted on the TOS. No effect for age was found.
3 Multivariate analysis with age as a covariate on the ESQ showed no effect for age. 
Discussion
Overall, this study of psychologists supports the view that different groups of scientists within a discipline have very different basic assumptions about their common discipline. Behavioral psychologists consistently and systematically differed from their randomly selected contemporaries over basic assumptions about psychology and science. These differences were most apparent in the behavioral group's endorsement of factual, quantitative, empirical, and objectivist approaches to the study of human behavior. In contrast, the comparison group was characterized by a more humanistic and subjectivist approach to psychology. Although our comparison group was limited by a low response rate, it should be noted that with respect to basic assumptions about psychology our comparison group was similar to Coan's (1979) larger, randomly selected sample of APA members. For example, on the composite second-order TOS factor, objectivism vs. subjectivism, Coan (1979) reported a mean score of 54.25 (SD = 11,94), and our group means were 50.65 (SD = 11.42) and 64.67 (SD = 11.93) for the comparison and behavioral groups, respectively. Consistent with Kuhn's (1970) analysis of science in general as well as with previous historical analyses of the behavior modification movement (Krasner, 1978; Krasner & Ullmann, 1965; Ullmann, 1969) , this study demonstrates the heuristic efficacy of conceptualizing scientists as communities of scholars who share different assumptions. However, it appears that this sharing of common assumptions may not extend beyond discipline-specific assumptions. The fact that we found no systematic differences between behavioral and nonbehavioral psychologists in values such as political and social philosophy could be due to methodological weaknesses of the VS, such as the low reliabilities of some of the scales. Although we recognize that definitive null statements cannot be supported in the absence of a power analysis, our results do suggest that broad values may be only marginally related to discipline-specific assumptions. Indeed, our finding that across both groups only a few weak relationships existed between assumptions about psychology and broader sociopolitical values supports this view. Because both groups shared the same pluralistic cultural heritage, it is reasonable to find that their broader value systems are similar. This interpretation suggests that such broad culturally determined values can be compatible with different, perhaps even orthogonal, discipline-specific assumptions. It is possible that these behavioral scientists select and value different assumptions about their discipline and that these choices are unrelated to their predilections with regard to broader value issues.
Such compartmentalization of values about science and values about society has been noted by investigators of the physical sciences with both praise and criticism (Graham, 1981; Holton, 1960; Kelves, 1979) . Though we do not advocate (value) such compartmentalization of values, the results from our sample point to the fact that behavioral scientists nevertheless separate their beliefs about their discipline from other beliefs they hold, whether they openly claimed to do so or not. In examining those subjects who specifically endorsed the view that science is value neutral, we found this view was significantly but marginally associated with physiological reductionism and quantitative emphasis in psychology, whereas those who espoused a more value-laden view favored intuitionist-subjectivist epistemology.
Contrary to the claims of some of its early critics (Koestler, 1967; Matson, 1973; Wheeler, 1973) , the values that characterize behavior modification as an approach to human behavior are not necessarily associated with any particular sociopolitical value system. Rather, it appears that behavior modification as a matrix of assumptions within psychology can include diverse points of view with respect to broad cultural values. The finding that within the behavioral group those who favored biological determinism also tended to endorse a conservative sociopolitical philosophy probably reflects the interrelatedness of these sets of assumptions. Though sample size precluded formal analysis of this relationship within the comparison group, the same trend was present. This same relationship between "nativism" and conservatism has been speculatively suggested by historians of psychology and biology (Billig, 1982; Gould, 1977 Gould, , 1981 , and our empirical results support the accuracy of those conceptual analyses.
If, as our case study suggests, psychology as a science is not value free, then it is incumbent upon us as scientists to continue the systematic investigation of the relationship between our values and our research. In order to carry out such a task, further refinements in both the methodology and conceptual framework of a value-laden view of science are needed. This case study has illustrated how a psychology of science can illumine some of the assumptions and values that characterize different groups of psychologists. Similar methods must be developed to assess the discipline-specific assumptions and values of other groups of scientists so that comparisons can be made across various scientific disciplines. It will be especially important to relate such assumptions to broader sociocultural and personal values in order to understand how the latter impact on the goals of research as well as on the influence of science on social planning and social policy. Only after such extensive research and critical self-examination will it be possible to demythologize the traditional view of science and develop the much needed integration of philosophy, history, sociology, and the psychology of science. It is both propitious and pragmatic that such a science of scientists should begin with psychologists, scientists whose discipline requires them to be at once subject and object of their own research,
